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SUMMARY 
The vulnerability of surface transportation to airborne carbon fibers and 
the national risk associated with the potential use of carbon fibers in the 
surface transportation system have been evaluated. Airborne carbon fibers may 
cause failure rates in surface transportation of less than one per year by 
1995. The national risk resulting from the use of carbon fibers in the surface 
transportation system is projected to be an annual dollar loss on the order of 
$6,000. 
INTRODUCTION 
This report describes the status of the Department of Transportation 
Carbon Fiber Project which addresses the surface transportation portion of the 
coordinated Federal Government Carbon Fiber Action Plan presented in reference 
1. 
The DOT responsibilities are to assess the vulnerability of surface 
transportation to airborne carbon fibers and to assess the national risk due 
to carbon fibers released from surface transportation. 
The project was divided into the following five tasks: 
(1) To estimate the quantities of carbon fiber that will be used in the 
surface transportation system by 1995. 
(2) To estimate the frequency and location of surface transportation 
system fire incidents. 
(3) To estimate through laboratory tests the size and quantity of carbon 
fibers released by surface transportation fires. 
(4) To estimate the vulnerability of the surface transportation system 
to airborne carbon fibers. 
(5) To estimate the national risk from carbon fibers released in surface 
transportation incidents. 
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CARBON FIBER COMPOSITE USAGE 
An estimate of the expected carbon fiber quantity and matrix composition 
in surface transportation was developed by DOT from a review of the existing 
literature, the Department of Commerce survey conducted in 1979 (presented in 
a preceding paper by Donald Parsons reference 2) and several independent 
inquiries to carbon fiber suppliers and users. This effort further established 
that the only prospective use of carbon fibers in the transportation system 
would be in automobiles, light trucks and heavy trucks. The DOT estimates 
place the7total carbon fiber usage in surface transportation in 1995 at less than 5XlO kg. The estimate DOT chose for its risk assessment was 2 kg in 
cars and light trucks and 15 kg in heavy trucks. Table 1 shows the actual DOT 
usage estimates and the expected matrix composition. 
TRANSPORTATION FIRES 
The exposure of carbon fiber composite materials to a severe fire is the 
principal mechanism for the release of carbon fibers. Table 2 shows a summary 
of surface transportation vehicle fires estimated by the U.S. Fire Administra-
tion (USFA) and a projection of total vehicle fires estimated by the National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA). As stated previously, nearly all carbon 
fiber materials used in surface transportation will be found in cars and 
trucks. Therefore, car and truck fires are of principal concern in a study of 
potential carbon fiber release incidents. 
The fire data inputs needed for the risk assessment consist of an estimate 
of the frequency and geographic location of the fire and portion of the vehicle 
involved. Fire frequency can be found in Table 2 but the above data sources 
have little information on geographic location. 
The Highway Safety Research Institute at the University of Michigan has 
collected information from fire department records on automobile fires in the 
state of Michigan for the two year period from 1976-1977. This data is 
collected by county and it was possible to establish a correlation between the 
annual automobile fires per county and county population. The correlation (a 
correlation coefficient of 0.97) indicated that the urban car is more 
susceptible to fire as most automobile fires occur in urban areas where the 
vehicle population density is highest. 
The other details of the automobile fire scenario which are important to 
fiber release are the severity of the fire and its location on the vehicle. 
The fire location on the vehicle was important to determine which of the 
composite materials were exposed to the fire. The vehicle fires were classi-
fied by one of the following scenarios: engine small, engine severe, passenger 
compartment small, passenger compartment severe and total conflagration. 
Severe fires were defined as the only fires that will release carbon fibers. 
Since no carbon fibers are expected to be used in the passenger compartment, 
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only severe engine fires and total vehicle conflagration fires will release 
fibers. Roughly one-third of the car and truck fires fall into these two 
release scenarios. This estimate is based on an analysis of the passenger 
vehicle dollar loss statistics for fires and is published by the California 
State Fire Marshall. 
LABORATORY TESTS 
All the laboratory and field test data available for the release by fire 
of carbon fibers from composite samples were on aerospace-grade, epoxy based 
materials, usually with post-fire impact or explosion. It was felt that this 
data was not an accurate representation of the fiber release expected from 
automotive-grade composite. Automotive composites are expected to be based on 
a matrix of vinyl ester or polyester and glass fibers blended with carbon 
fibers. 
DOT developed a series of laboratory tests to measure carbon fiber 
release from automotive-type composites. The tests were designed to evaluate 
carbon fiber release under conditions which simulated automobile fires, namely 
high and low radiant heat flux with an l800°C propane/air flame, fuel rich or 
fuel lean. The burning time was 10 minutes and there was no post-fire impact 
or explosion. Prior to the execution of the program by NASA-Ames and its 
contractor, Scientific Services, Inc., users and suppliers of the carbon 
fiber materials were asked to review and comment on the test program. 
The results of this test program are briefly summarized in Table 3. The 
quantities of carbon fiber released were found to be sensitive to the test 
condition but not to the matrix resin. Depending on the test conditions, the 
basic results from this test program were an average carbon fiber release over 
the range from 0.003 percent to 0.06 percent of the composite carbon fiber 
weight. Ninety-nine percent of all carbon fibers released were less than three 
millimeters in length. Fibers of this length in the quantities released from 
the test are unlikely to cause electrical failures in any individual incident. 
VULNERABILITY OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 
Surface transportation systems have been designed to operate reliably and 
safely in an environment of dust, oil, salt spray and vandalism. These 
system requirements produce a system design which is not easily affected by a 
carbon fiber hazard. From the above analysis of the Michigan data, it was 
determined that most of the carbon fiber exposure will be in the vicinity of 
the urban roadway system. Since very little of this urban roadway system 
interfaces with the waterway transportation system, the vulnerability of water 
transportation was not evaluated beyond a brief qualitative determination that 
it would be relatively invulnerable to the few carbon fibers to which it would 
be exposed. The remaining modes bore the brunt of the exposure and were 
thoroughly evaluated. 
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The method used to estimate the vulnerability of a surface transportation 
system was to divide the system into subsystems and, if necessary, components 
to a point where the vulnerability of the subsystem or component could be 
estimated from vulnerability data published by NASA and DOD. The effects of 
the subsystem failure are then classified as safety, performance or convenience 
failures. A safety failure occurs when there is a significant loss of system 
safety; a performance failure occurs when there is a significant loss in system 
performance; and a convenience failure occurs when there is a significant loss 
in the perceived comfort or convenience by the passengers or crew. This 
analysis as applied to the passenger car is seen in Tablg 4. In the vulner-
ability column, V indicates a vulnerability less than 10 fiber seconds/meter3; 
P means that the equipment is sealed against fiber penetration; and C means 
that the current and voltage ranges are insensitive to carbon fibers. For 
example, the alternator will burn out any carbon fibers which penetrate it, the 
voltage regulator is potted in plastic, but carbon fibers can interface with 
the operation of the radio. Table 4 shows that only radios may be vulnerable 
to carbon fibers. sTests have shown that an automobile radio has a vulnerabili-
ty greater than 10 fiber seconds/meter3 • The passenger car, thus, is 
effectively not vulnerable. 
Similar analyses have shown that both the truck and the bus are also not 
vulnerable. Traffic signal systems are housed in sealed enclosures which will 
exclude carbon fibers so that they too are not vulnerable. The net result is 
that the highway system is not vulnerable to airborne carbon fibers. 
Electrified rail systems were analyzed by dividing them into carborne, 
wayside, electric substation and signal subsystems. The result of this 
analysis is shown in Table 5. These vulnerabilities, with the exception of 
the signal system, all represent system failures. Most of the failures are 
monetary and are likely to require no maintenance or repair, e.g., a flash-
over at a third-rail insulator. The vulnerability of the vehicle is shown for 
both a single car and a six-car train. The vulnerability of the six-car train 
assumes that the traction motors must fail on more than three cars for the 
train to fail. This is a reasonable assumption since the performance of a 
train is not significantly affected until more than half its cars lose their 
traction motors. It is, in fact, common for transit systems to have failed 
cars in their trains. 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
A typical surface transportation release incident can be characterized as 
a release of 20 grams of single fibers, less than 3 mm long; most of the fibers 
fallout within a kilometer of the source, and the incident frequency is 
correlated with population. It is estimated that there will be 100,000 such 
incidents a year. Preliminary calculations show that the probability that 
there is any damage from an individual incident is very low. As discussed in 
reference 3, the case where there are a large number of incidents with a low 
probability of damage by an individual incident is best modeled analytically 
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by Poisson statistics. 
The national risk due to fibers released by surface transportation was 
computed by the NASA Langley Research Center contractor Arthur D. Little Inc. 
under a reimbursable agreement from DOT to NASA. A brief review of their 
method is as follows: 
The number of release incidents and number of carbon fibers released each 
year is estimated for each of 3,000 counties in the. U.S. 
The number of equipments, along with their associated vulnerabilities and 
failure costs, is tabulated for these counties. 
The losses for the individual counties are then calculated and summed to 
determine the national risk. 
The result of this calculation was a projected annual national dollar 
loss, associated with the use of carbon fibers in surface transportation, on 
the order of $6,000 per year. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The vulnerability of surface transportation to airborne carbon fibers is 
very low. The risk of failure is less than one a year at the carbon fiber 
hazard level predicted for the year 1995. Similarly, the national risk due to 
this hazard is very low. The annual dollar or loss estimate is on the order 
of $6,000 a year. Because of this small vulnerability and risk, the DOT 
carbon fiber program will conclude early in FY 80. 
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Year 
1990 
1995 
RESIN 
Polyester 
Vinyl ester 
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TABLE 1 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CF USAGE ESTIMATES 
Average CF/Auto 
(KG) 
0.5 
2.0 
PROJECTED MATRIX COMPOSITION 
TYPE 
Graphite/Qlass 
Hybird 
Graphite/Glass 
Hybird 
Average CF/ 
Heavy Truck (KG) 
1.0 
15.0 
I 
TABLE 2 
TRANSPORTATION FIRES* (1977 - USFA) 
PASSENGER VEHICLES 325,000 
FREIGHT ROAD VEHICLES 58,000 
RAIL TRANS. VEHICLES 2,800 
WATER TRANS. VESSEL 1,850 
AIR TRANS. VEHICLE 550 
HEAVY EQUIPMENT 7,000 
SPECIAL VEHICLES 2,700 
OTHER MOBILE PROPERTY 100 
UNDETERMINED 62,000 
TOTAL 460,000 
NFPA EST.*1< TOTAL 490,000 
*EST. BASED ON 26% SAMPLE OF U.S. POP. (8 STATES) 
**BASED ON DATA FROM 4% OF FIRE DEPTS. (IN 50 STATES) 
TABLE 3 
TEST RESULTS 
HIGH RADIANT, FUEL LEAN LOW RADIANT, FUEL RICH 
AVERAGE PERCENT RELEASED 
AVERAGE MEDIAN 
FIBER LENGTH 
.003% 
0.1 MM 
.06% 
0.9 MM 
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SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT 
ENGINE: 
IGNITION 
ALTERNATOR 
VOLTAGE REGULATOR 
BATTERY 
STARTER 
CHASSIS: 
HEATER 
WINDOW DEFOGGER 
WIPER/WASHER 
FUEL: 
PUMP 
EMISSION CONTROLS 
INJECTION 
LIGHTING: 
HEADLIGHT 
TAIL LIGHT 
BRAKE 
TURN 
INTERIOR 
ACCESSORIES: 
CLOCK 
ENTERTAINMENT - RADIO 
CB RADIO 
DIGITAL INST. 
PASSENGER 
V - POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE. 
TABLE 4 
CAR ELECTRICAL 
VULNERABILITY 
P 
C 
P 
C 
C 
C 
C 
P 
P 
P 
P 
C 
C 
C 
C 
P 
P 
V 
V 
P 
P - PROTECTED FROM PENETRATION OF CARBON FIBER. 
SYSTEMS 
EFFECT 
PERFORMANCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
SAFETY 
SAFETY 
SAFETY 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
C - CURRENT OR VOLTAGE 'IN A RANGE NOT SENSITIVE TO CARBON FIBER. 
VEHICLE 
SINGLE CAR 
6 CAR TRAIN 
WAYSIDE POWER 
SUBSTATION 
SIGNAL SYSTEM 
TABLE 5 
VULNERABILITY OF AN ELECTRIFIED RAIL SYSTEM 
FIBER SEC/METER3 
1. 5 ,X 105 
1.5 X 109 
1.8 X 106 
3.5 X 108 
6 X 109 
